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Abstract
Background: Recent changes to regulatory guidance in the US and Europe have complicated oversight of
secondary research by rendering most uses of de-identified data exempt from human subjects oversight. To
identify the implications of such guidelines for harms to participants and communities, this paper explores the
secondary uses of one de-identified DNA sample collection with limited oversight: the Human Genome Diversity
Project (HGDP)-Centre d’Etude du Polymorphisme Humain, Fondation Jean Dausset (CEPH) Human Genome
Diversity Panel.
Methods: Using a combination of keyword and cited reference search, we identified English-language scientific
articles published between 2002 and 2009 that reported analysis of HGDP Diversity Panel samples and/or data. We
then reviewed each article to identify the specific research use to which the samples and/or data was applied.
Secondary uses were categorized according to the type and kind of research supported by the collection.
Results: A wide variety of secondary uses were identified from 148 peer-reviewed articles. While the vast majority
of these uses were consistent with the original intent of the collection, a minority of published reports described
research whose primary findings could be regarded as controversial, objectionable, or potentially stigmatizing in
their interpretation.
Conclusions: We conclude that potential risks to participants and communities cannot be wholly eliminated by
anonymization of individual data and suggest that explicit review of proposed secondary uses, by a Data Access
Committee or similar internal oversight body with suitable stakeholder representation, should be a required
component of the trustworthy governance of any repository of data or specimens.
Background
Human tissue and DNA sample collections have prolif-
erated over the last several decades along with increas-
ing secondary use of genotypic and phenotypic data in
research. Yet, there is little consensus regarding the
effective governance of secondary research uses, beyond
adherence to the terms of informed consent. Recent
changes to regulatory guidance in the US and Europe
[1-3] have further complicated oversight of secondary
research by focusing narrowly on risks related to indivi-
dual identifiability, rendering most uses of anonymized
data exempt from human subjects oversight. To identify
the implications of such guidelines for harms to partici-
pants and communities this paper explores, by way of a
case example, the secondary uses of the Human Gen-
ome Diversity Project (HGDP)-Centre d’Etude du Poly-
morphisme Humain, Fondation Jean Dausset (CEPH)
Human Genome Diversity Panel, as reported from
2002-2009.
The HGDP-CEPH Human Genome Diversity Panel
(hereafter, “HGDP Diversity Panel”) is a collection of
cultured lymphoblastoid cell lines derived from 1,050
individuals drawn from 51 different human populations
[4]. The samples from which the cell lines are derived
were collected by multiple independent investigators
over a period of years and subsequently donated to the
central collection by common agreement [5]. While the
collection shares certain similarities (including its name)
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controversial HGDP [7-12], in practice only a minority
of its samples were prospectively collected with the
intent of contributing to a representative global sample
of human genetic variation [5]. Informed consent for
academic research use consistent with sample de-identi-
fication was verified by HGDP investigators at the time
the collection was established in 2002, although the spe-
cific terms of consent vary (Ref [4]; Greely, personal
communication). Only two other pieces of linked infor-
mation are archived with samples: (1) the geographic
location of sampling (specified by both geographic coor-
dinates and population name), and (2) the sex of the
individual from whom the sample was taken. The
resource has been described as “useful for SNP [Single
Nucleotide Polymorphism] discovery, analyzing SNP and
haplotype variability and structure, and for determining
global sequence variation at various [genetic] loci” [4].
As an amalgamated set of samples collected by a
range of investigators for diverse primary research pur-
poses, the HGDP panel is similar to other recent data
sharing initiatives that aim to pool pre-existing samples
and/or data to facilitate data mining and different forms
of genetic research [13]. However, access to the HGDP
Diversity Panel is based not in a formal review of pro-
posed research but rather on an emailed agreement to
specified terms of collaboration, which may include a
brief description of anticipated research uses (Cann, per-
sonal communication). Investigators who obtain aliquots
of the collection agree not to transfer DNA samples to
other laboratories, to genotype a non-redundant panel
of 951 individuals with their chosen genetic markers,
and to return those data to the collection’s central data-
base at the time of publication (Cann, personal commu-
nication). A review of the published research enabled by
the resource therefore provides insight into the types of
secondary research uses made possible by wide sharing
of de-identified data (uses often not available to public
inspection), and permits an examination of the potential
negative consequences of limited oversight.
Methods
As of 1 December 2010, DNA from the collection has
been distributed to 107 investigators http://www.cephb.
fr/en/hgdp/diversity.php Ma n ym o r er e s e a r c h e r sh a v e
taken advantage of the genotypic (in silico) information
derived from the sample collection, readily available for
downloading either from the CEPH itself or from the
website of lead investigators [14]. We identified major
classes of secondary research use of the collection from
a review of primary scientific articles published between
2002 and 2009 that reported analysis of HGDP Diversity
Panel samples and/or data. English-language articles,
which cited Cann et al. 2002 (Ref [4], the article that
first described the collection) or Rosenberg et al. 2002
(Ref [15], the first major analysis of global genetic varia-
tion using the collection), and/or referenced the HGDP
in the abstract or title, were identified from the ISI Web
of Science
® search engine. Although we are confident
that most published research using the sample collection
or derived data was captured with this search strategy,
we cannot be certain that all HGDP Diversity Panel
linked publications were included. Our review excluded
review articles and articles focused primarily on human
versus non-human comparisons, as well as research that
had been conducted but not yet published at the time of
our search (Spring 2009).
Results
HGDP Secondary Uses in the Published Literature
The published analyses of the HGDP Diversity Panel
encompass a wide variety of secondary research uses,
ranging from analyses of genetic variation aimed at
addressing questions of population genetic or medical
genetic significance to different forms of methods devel-
opment (Table 1).
The vast majority of the publications we identified
focused on genetic analyses of variation within and
among the different populations represented in the col-
lection (130 of 148 articles total). Forty-eight of these
reports characterized genetic variation with respect to
geography (global or regional) or described patterns of
variation as they were identified for specific candidate
genes or distinct classes of genetic markers (e.g. simple
tandem repeats, copy number variants). In other cases,
assessment of genetic variation was undertaken with the
intention of inferring human evolutionary history (36
publications). A further 29 reports described attempts to
identify the effects of natural selection on genes pre-
viously implicated in behavioral (e.g. schizophrenia,
depression) or physical (e.g. skin color, brain size) char-
acteristics, or via a consideration of genome-wide pat-
terns of variation. A smaller number of publications (n
= 17) reported using the collection as normal ‘control’
samples in studies aimed at identifying clinically signifi-
cant genetic mutations. The remaining 18 reports
described methods-oriented research that involved
either using HGDP samples to validate new molecular
assays or, more typically, using genotype data derived
from the collection (e.g. Ref [15]) as the basis for testing
algorithms designed to assess aspects of population
structure or estimate key demographic parameters.
Potentially Objectionable HGDP-Related Research
While the vast majority of secondary uses described in
these published reports were in line with the original
intent of the collection (as described above), a minority
of published reports described research whose primary
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able, or potentially stigmatizing in their interpretation.
Because we acknowledge that any assessment in this
regard is necessarily subjective (hence ripe for critique
and debate), we highlight specific examples only, noting
interpretations identified in previously scholarly discus-
sion as problematic.
Table 2 outlines five such examples, including reports
for which polymorphisms associated with traits such as
addiction, mental illness, or brain size were shown to be
differentially distributed with respect to population
background, or in which patterns of genetic variation
were linked to social identity (e.g., Jewish ancestry) or
geographic location. While none of these findings is
likely to have directly affected the individuals whose
samples and/or data were analyzed, to the degree that
these reports support potentially unfavorable conclu-
sions about the populations from which participants
Table 1 HGDP Diversity Panel: Classes of Secondary Research Use
Class Type Kind Number Examples
Analysis Population Genetic Characterize Population Variation 48 candidate genes (alcoholism, Parkinson’s disease)
geography (global or regional)
types of genetic markers (STRs, CNVs)
Infer Human Evolutionary History and/or
Ancestry
36 correlation with environment or language
identification of ancestry informative markers
patterns of linkage disequilibrium
Infer Effects of Natural Selection 29 genome-wide investigation
behavioral characteristics (schizophrenia,
depression)
physical characteristics (skin color, brain size)
Medical Genetic Control Samples for Disease Gene Studies 17 cleft lip and palate
heroin addiction
vertebral malformations
Methods Algorithm
Development
14 genetic ancestry estimation
population structure detection
Molecular Assay 4 multiplex assay development
Table 2 Findings Supported by the Use of the HGDP Diversity Panel
Type Publication Excerpt from Abstract Interpretation
Addiction Bierut, L. J., et al. (2008). “Variants in nicotinic
receptors and risk for nicotine dependence.” Am J
Psychiatry 165(9): 1163-71.
“A genetic variant marking an amino acid change
showed association with the smoking phenotype (p =
0.007)...t its frequency varied across human
populations (0% in African populations to 37% in
European populations).”
Europeans are More
Susceptible to Nicotine
Dependence [29]
Ancestry Need, A. C., et al. (2009). “A genome-wide genetic
signature of Jewish ancestry perfectly separates
individuals with and without full Jewish ancestry in a
large random sample of European Americans.”
Genome Biol 10(1): R7.
“.. within Americans of European ancestry there is a
perfect genetic corollary of Jewish ancestry which, in
principle, would permit near perfect genetic inference
of Ashkenazi Jewish ancestry.”
Jewish People are
Genetically Distinct [30]
Genetic
Variation
Rosenberg, N. A., et al. (2002). “Genetic structure of
human populations.” Science 298(5602): 2381-2385.
“...without using prior information about the origins of
individuals, we identified six main genetic clusters, five
of which correspond to major geographic regions,
and subclusters that often correspond to individual
populations.”
Racial and/or Ethnic
Group Differences are
“Real” (i.e. Genetic) [31]
Mental
Illness
Gardner, M., A., et al. (2006). “Extreme population
differences across Neuregulin 1 gene, with
implications for association studies.” Molecular
Psychiatry 11(1): 66-75.
“... allele differences are especially relevant in two SNPs
located in a large intron of the gene, as shown by the
extreme FST values, which reveal genetic stratification
correlated to broad continental areas.”
Populations Differ
Significantly in
Schizophrenia
Susceptibility [32]
Natural
Selection
Mekel-Bobrov, N., et al. (2005). “Ongoing adaptive
evolution of ASPM, a brain size determinant in Homo
sapiens.” Science 309(5741): 1720-1722.
“.. one genetic variant of ASPM in humans arose
merely about 5800 years ago and has since swept to
high frequency under strong positive selection. These
findings... suggest that the human brain is still
undergoing rapid adaptive evolution.”
Brain Size has Evolved
More Rapidly in Non-
African Populations [33]
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harms to both individuals and groups.
Discussion
Secondary Uses of De-Identified Data and the Avoidance
of Harm
The Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP)
has deemed that research on specimens or data that
have been delinked from personally identifiable informa-
tion is not subject to federal regulation related to
human subjects [2,3], which is consistent with guidelines
for exemption by the Common Rule that regulates the
protection of human subjects in all federally funded
research [16] and the Health Insurance and Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) that protects against
the disclosure of individually identifiable health informa-
tion [17]. Neither statute, however, provides clarity on
the oversight of secondary use of genetic information
which, in sufficient quantity, may - in and of itself -
allow re-identification [18,19]. Treating nominally de-
identified DNA samples and/or derived genetic informa-
tion as exempt from human subjects regulation facili-
tates the goal of data sharing among researchers and
institutions while minimizing the potential for harm to
individuals arising from public release of confidential
personal information [20].
However, harms may emerge when group identifica-
tion is retained with sample collections, leading to stig-
matization or other kinds of “group harm” [21,22].
Individual and group harm may also emerge in the form
of a violation of trust when samples are used in research
that the original study participants would find objection-
able, a form of “dignitary harm” [23]. In 1989, for exam-
ple, 200 Havasupai tribal members provided blood
samples for what was described by researchers at Ari-
zona State University as a population-based study of dia-
betes. Later, the Tribe discovered that the samples were
used in a number of other studies involving research on
schizophrenia, inbreeding, and human migration. In
2004, the Tribe filed a lawsuit against the Arizona Board
of Regents claiming that the original informed consent
agreement was violated by these secondary uses [24].
Under current guidelines, the secondary distribution of
individually de-identified data was not subject to
research oversight and yet, Tribal research participants
(both individually and as a group) experienced harm.
Moreover, the harm incurred was not simply due to a
“breach of contract” (i.e., uses not specified at the time
of consent) but from the use of samples for research
purposes regarded as culturally dissonant and deeply
objectionable [24]. In 2010, the Board of Regents agreed
to pay $700,000 to tribe members as part of a settlement
with the Tribe. In addition, the university agreed to
return blood samples and provide assistance in building
a health clinic on the Havasupai reservation and provide
educational scholarships for tribal members [25].
The HGDP Diversity Panel samples are individually
de-identified but linked to population of origin and,
arguably, certain of the groups represented in the collec-
tion have been harmed by findings such as those out-
lined in Table 2. With respect to the potential for
dignitary harm to individuals, there is not enough pub-
licly available information on the terms of informed
consent to judge whether the reported research uses are
consistent with participants’ expectations. Nevertheless,
it is not hard to imagine that some contributing partici-
pants would regard as objectionable research that
attempts to correlate genetic variation with social iden-
tity or geographic location, or implies ethnic differences
in addiction, mental illness, or intelligence. Indeed,
initial objections to the originally proposed Human
Genome Diversity Project (which, as noted above, is lar-
gely unrelated to the current collection managed by the
CEPH) were based in concerns that samples would be
used in these and related ways [7-12].
Implications of HGDP Uses for Research Governance
We acknowledge that the degree to which the research
uses described in Table 2 represent a tangible harm to
individual research subjects and/or communities is sub-
ject to interpretation and disagreement. Our findings are
interesting not because of what they say about the sec-
ondary uses of the HGDP Diversity Panel per se,b u t
because of what they suggest about the range of
research uses that are possible when samples and/or
data are rendered exempt from research oversight.
Investigators and institutions with primary responsibility
for standing biospecimen collections and/or data reposi-
tories should recognize that potential harms cannot be
altogether avoided by removing individually identifying
information. While it may be perfectly legitimate, from
a narrow regulatory vantage point, to waive research
oversight in such cases, foregoing governance of second-
ary research uses could prove, in certain cases, ethically
inadequate [26]. And this will remain true even if all
participants have provided explicit permission for broad
data sharing and open-ended research use at the time of
informed consent.
1
It is impossible to say whether a more systematic form
of oversight on the part of the CEPH, that addressed the
potential for group and/or individual dignitary harm,
would have avoided these outcomes or resulted in pub-
lished research better aligned with participants’ (pre-
sumed) expectations. A challenge for sample collections
such as the HGDP Diversity Panel, which have been
aggregated over long periods of time, is that original
informed consent documents are either unavailable or
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potential secondary uses. Hence there is no firm basis to
guide a Data Access Committee (DAC) or similar over-
sight body with respect to whether a proposed use is
allowable or prohibited. Moreover, even when consent is
available, it is unclear whether this type of front-end
review sufficiently addresses the implicit expectations of
individual participants or identifies when groups’ inter-
ests could be significantly compromised by particular
classes of investigation.
Rather than grounding decision-making solely in the
specifics of the consent language, DACs and similar
oversight bodies should consider alternative mechanisms
for soliciting the views of individuals with salient
insights regarding the interests of participants or their
communities. In this way, a more beneficial, and ulti-
mately trustworthy, form of data stewardship will be
achieved [27].
Conclusions
The wide range of published research using the HGDP
Diversity Panel demonstrates the utility of a globally-dis-
tributed collection of individually de-identified popula-
tion-based DNA samples and derived genotypic data.
Nevertheless, a minority of studies highlighted in our
analysis fall into an ethical “grey zone,” involving the
investigation of research questions which many might
regard as socially sensitive and potentially at odds with
the desires and expectations of participants. These
observations demonstrate that potential risks cannot be
wholly eliminated by anonymization and suggest that
on-going review of proposed secondary uses will be
required for the trustworthy stewardship of even fully
de-identified data.
The exact form such review should take is more com-
plex. With the increasing popularity of broad consent,
and the intentional re-purposing of older, variably con-
sented, samples and data, consent-led review will be
neither sufficient nor flexible enough to safeguard
against all possible harms. The current system is ill-
equipped to address the potential for group and/or dig-
nitary harms and any decision by reviewers to disallow
research that poses such risks may be seen as curbing
academic freedom. This tension requires that data stew-
ards adopt procedures that allow due consideration of
relevant stakeholder perspectives as part of the review
process. This may be achieved either by including parti-
cipant representatives as voting members of the over-
sight group tasked with reviewing access requests, by
providing participants with periodic updates about the
current uses of individual or aggregate data (with the
option to withdraw from future research if these uses
are not commensurate with their expectations), or by
soliciting the perspectives of the original recruiting
investigators, who are beholden to participants by dint
of on-going research interactions. Simultaneously, the
data access review process should be made, as far as fea-
sible, clearly communicated and transparent so that the
nature of requests granted and refused are available not
just to participants but for wider public inspection and
debate. Such approaches will create robust opportunities
for identifying and addressing secondary uses that fall
into potential ethical grey zones and provide a strong
basis for promoting participant and public trust in the
broader research enterprise.
Endnotes
1Recently, the U.S. DHHS and the White House Office
for Science & Technology Policy (OSTP) issued an
A d v a n c eN o t i c eo fP r o p o s e dR u l e m a k i n g( A N P R M )
that aims to revise current federal human research
protection regulations for the first time since 1991
[28]. The proposed changes acknowledge secondary
use of biospecimens and data as potentially identifi-
able, however only stipulate a requirement of general
consent for future use. In addition, the ANPRM pro-
poses expanding the eligibility for secondary use for
exemption from human subjects review. Discussion of
the unanticipated harms that can emerge from second-
ary use as illustrated in the case of HGDP Diversity
Panel is particularly critical during this period of pub-
lic comment on the ANPRM.
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